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Walking and chewing gum at the same time:
Australia’s free trade area strategy*
Christopher Findlay

The pursuit of free trade area agreements (FTAs), according to some, does not
impede the multilateral trade negotiations process. It is argued to the contrary in the
present paper that the FTA approach does impede the multilateral one. Comments
are oﬀered on common approaches to the analysis of the impact of FTAs, on the
reasons why, despite concerns evident in these comments, the FTA strategy has
become so popular, and on ways out of a dilemma of FTA proliferation, or at least
ways to avoid the risks associated with it.
1. Introduction
... the argument put by some academics that we can’t walk and
chew gum at the same time and therefore should focus
exclusively on the Doha multilateral negotiations rather than
an FTA with the USA – or with Singapore, or Thailand, or in
our prospective trade agreements with Japan and China – is
nonsense – pure and simple.
1
The Australian Trade Minister, Mark Vaile, has drawn an analogy between
being able to walk and chew gum at the same time and the current Australian
trade policy strategy which includes the pursuit of free trade area agreements
(FTAs) alongside participation in the work of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). The quotation implies that it is possible to do both things at the same
* The present paper is based on an Invited Paper presented to the Trade Plenary at
the Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in Canberra
13–15 February, 2002. Thanks are due to the participants in the session and to the Journal’s
referees for their comments. All errors are the author’s. Work on this paper was supported by
a grant from the Australian Research Council.
 Asia Paciﬁc School of Economics and Management, The Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia.
1Extract from a speech by The Hon. Mark Vaile, MP, Minister for Trade, Australia,
delivered on his behalf by Senator Chris Ellison at the National Farmers Federation Annual
Conference, Carnarvon, WA, May 23, 2002 [emphasis added in the original].
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the present paper that the FTA approach does impede the multilateral one,
and that there are other strategies to use in the new preferential trade policy
game.
The Government’s report on the Australia-Thailand FTA negotiations
(DFAT 2002) illustrates the arguments now being made in favour of a
greater focus on FTAs in our trade policy package. As the Minister noted
in the same speech: ‘no Australian government has pursued a more
ambitious and diverse trade policy than has our government’.
2 FTAs,
it is argued (and as stated in the executive summary of the Thailand
report):
• bring signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts (indicated by the growth in trade and
investment, and estimates of increases in welfare);
• provide a framework for cooperating on a wider range of issues than just
liberalisation of trade in goods (e.g. they could include services, invest-
ment, e-commerce, standards and competition policy);
• are consistent with the parties’ goals in the APEC process concerning free
and open trade and investment by 2010 for a developed economy and;
• are consistent with eﬀorts to secure trade reforms through the multilateral
trade round launched at Doha.
Why bother with international agreements? The analysis and empirical
work on the eﬀects of liberalisation show that generally the greater part of
the beneﬁts of reform come from the actions of the economy which is the
focus of that analysis. That is, the greater bulk of the beneﬁts can be
obtained from unilateral action. However, unilateral action is not easy
because it imposes costs on some people who are able to mobilise political
resistance, even though they may be relatively small in number.
3 Domestic
interests from whom the policy-makers can draw support to oﬀset the
resistance of others to change can accelerate reform. Those forces in favour
of reform are easier to mobilise in an environment where it is understood
that other countries are also liberalising. Policy change in those other
economies will create new market access opportunities. International
2Findlay (2002) provides further information on negotiations in progress. Progress in
signing agreements has been slower than originally expected. Comments are oﬀered below on
why that might be so.
3Unilateral action can also lead to adverse movements of import compared to export prices.
See Yang et al. (2000) for a commentary on the implications of this in terms of trade eﬀect for
a concerted approach to unilateral reform.
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policy.
4 It also provides a forum in which to bind policy to avoid
backsliding at a later date.
The remarks below challenge the expectation that the FTA track assists the
multilateral system in this process. Comments are oﬀered on common
approaches to the analysis of the impact of FTAs, on the reasons why,
despite concerns evident in these comments, the FTA strategy has become so
popular, and on ways out of the dilemma of FTA proliferation, or at least
ways to avoid the risks associated with it.
5
2. Analysis of FTAs
A common approach to the analysis of FTAs is to apply general equilibrium
modelling to capture the economic eﬀects. As Robinson and Thierfelder
(2002) report, generally these methods ﬁnd that trade creation exceeds
diversion, and that welfare of the members improves.
6 Furthermore, they
ﬁnd that welfare improves for old members when new members are added,
suggesting an incentive to expand membership.
As Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) also point out, it is possible to ﬁnd
larger beneﬁts in the modelling work by taking into account imperfect
competition, economies of scale, and investment ﬂows. Krueger (1999)
reports larger beneﬁts from more recent studies that are based on models
whose speciﬁcations permit the identiﬁcation of more of the dynamic gains.
An example of this approach is the work by Davis et al. (2000). They
simulate the eﬀects of a free trade area involving the members of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations Trade Agreement (CER), using the APG-cubed model (18
countries and 6 sectors). They allow for allocative eﬃciency eﬀects, terms
of trade changes and capital accumulation for goods and services, as well as
4Cooperation need not take place in the rules-based system of the WTO. The APEC process
is based on a concerted approach to unilateral action.
5There is a vast amount of literature on regional trading arrangements. See Lloyd (1996) for
a discussion of types of regional arrangements and Panagariya (2000) for a review of the
literature on preferential arrangements.
6Vousden (1990), section 10.2 provides a thorough discussion of the welfare eﬀects of
preferential arrangements on member economies, including a review of the traditional notions
of trade creation and diversion. For more recent reviews of this literature, see Robinson and
Thierfelder (2002), who provide a review of theoretical results before oﬀering an excellent
summary of the empirical work, and also Panagariya (2000). Care should be taken in mod-
elling the impact of the APEC process, because its liberalisation is not preferential, but often
assessments of its impact are lined up against NAFTA or AFTA which are preferential. See
Yang et al. (2000) for a clear treatment of the APEC process.
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joint AFTA-CER FTA (of an extra $US25.6bGDP in net present value
terms in AFTA and $US22.5bfor CER).
7 These gains are nearly three times
as great as the results of an earlier study which excluded services
liberalisation and these productivity eﬀects.
Adding in the dynamic eﬀects certainly adds to the estimates of the size of
the gains. But has the analysis so far captured all of the relevant dynamic
eﬀects? Two additional eﬀects of FTAs which aﬀect their contribution to
wider ranging liberalisation and therefore larger welfare gains, include those
on the political economy of domestic reform and on the reactions of trading
partners.
A further concern is that some acknowledged complexities of FTAs have,
so far, not been analysed in any depth. These include the problems associated
with excluded sectors, the use of a series of small group arrangements, the
presence of regional or global supply networks, and the risks of partial
reform in the presence of foreign direct investment.
2.1 Political economy dynamics
The creation of preferential arrangements creates new interest groups that
gain rents from their special position in foreign markets. Import demand
from the member economy is diverted to them, increasing their producer
surplus. Members of these groups might also capture rents from a privileged
position in a foreign market for services. What incentive do they then have to
give up part of these gains by admitting new members? The community as a
whole may be better oﬀ by expansion of membership but what drives policy?
Private interests have a considerable role to play in determining policy and
it is the management of private interests which is the core issue in the present
paper. FTAs create new interest groups that resist further change. These
groups are created among export interests who previously were relied upon to
drive domestic policy change under the multilateral process. The export
interests who, if given the alternative of a multilateral solution would have
taken policy ‘all the way’, are fractured.
8 The additional gains they reap from
taking the extra step to global free trade are small relative to the costs of the
domestic political activity required. The ability to organise the coalition in
favour of global free trade is weakened. The FTA strategy is therefore
7The real consumption gain allowing for the ability to shift spending through time is
one per cent by 2005 for AFTA as a whole and 0.6 per cent for CER.
8Some of the theoretical literature which captures these eﬀects is reviewed in Findlay (2002),
in particular, see papers by Krishna (1998); McLaren (1999); and Andriamananjara (2002).
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strategy was built.
2.2 Reactions by others
The assessment of the FTA route usually considers each agreement one at
a time. There is little consideration of how other trading partners might
react. Yet evidence is also available that even small group arrangements
create at least some trade diverting eﬀects and terms of trade eﬀects. Trade
diversion, which also aﬀects the terms of trade of those economies, will
have an eﬀect on their welfare.
9 It is not only the actual but also the
expected eﬀects that matter for strategy. Wide ranging use of FTAs by one
economy will lead to a reaction by others. At the least, this may involve
some action to express their concern, but also to negotiate their own
agreements in order to compensate for the actual or anticipated eﬀects of
the adoption of this strategy by their trading partners. Therefore, the
second round eﬀect is that a single initiative by one economy contributes
to a series of such initiatives. Some people would say that this outcome is
exactly what is sought. But will serial preferentialism build into global free
trade?
2.3 Excluded sectors
The assessments of an FTA generally assume it will be implemented without
exception. The eﬀects on trade are derived, for example, from modelling
results which assume all tariﬀs are removed on the trade between members.
More recent work also attempts to include the eﬀects of removing all
impediments to trade and investment in services.
10
However, each member of a potential FTA has one or more sensitive
sectors about which it is concerned. They are likely to be sectors which are
already relatively highly protected (e.g. agriculture in northeast Asian
economies and the USA, or textiles and clothing in Australia). There is a risk
that trade barriers in these sectors will be excluded, because cutting those
barriers will be resisted by the private interests who lose from that cut in
protection. The size of the gains from reform in the context of an FTA,
9See for example the GTAP results in Centre for International Economics (2001).
10Some of the modelling work tries to take into account the possibility that not all sectors
will be covered. But given the nature of the models and the degree of aggregation involved, this
is done by assuming impediments are removed on trade between members to a degree less than
100 per cent. However, the tariﬀ cuts actually implemented are not uniform. It is more likely
that some tariﬀs will be cut and others not, so the degree of dispersion in rates of protection
could increase, thus reducing the beneﬁts of the policy change.
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political support required to oﬀset this resistance. In other words, motivating
reform in this setting, while it might appear easier because there are fewer
international parties involved, is actually harder because the ﬂow and
concentration of domestic beneﬁts may not yield the political support
required to deal with the sensitive sectors.
11
The consequence is that if an agreement is ever signed, some sectors will be
excluded. Furthermore, the package of exclusions is likely to vary between
FTAs, because each has a diﬀerent membership and each group has a
diﬀerent set of sensitive sectors. The assumption, often implicit, is that the
FTA route leads to free trade because the diﬀerent agreements can be
aggregated. That is, preferences in trade are distributed more and more
widely until eventually the whole world is included. It is not clear, however,
in the presence of exclusions that this processing of ‘bolting together’ of the
agreements will be feasible.
12
2.4 Series of small group arrangements
In this environment, the likely scenario is a series of small agreements.
13 The
resistance to taking in new members to an existing agreement and building a
larger one are real. However, there are some countries who will be attractive
members of preferential arrangements (large countries in particular) and
these economies can emerge as hubs in a series of agreements. Snape (1996a)
explains that there is an incentive to create tailor-made agreements to deal
with products regarded as ‘diﬃcult’ by the hub country. He also notes that
small countries have incentives to join, especially as more and more countries
sign up with the hub. The hub-and-spoke system can ‘spread like a rash’
11Dealing with agricultural subsidies in the USA is an example of a policy reform which
is expected to require participation of a wider set of interests in the process of change.
In commentary on the prospects for a free trade agreement between Australia and the USA.
Mr Vaile has been quoted as saying that ‘the issue of agricultural subsidies was only ever going
to be dealt with through the WTO’s Doha round of talks’ (in Sid Marris and Rodney Dalton,
‘US paves way for free trade’, The Australian, Monday, July 29, 2002, p. 4).
12Freund (2000) presents a model in which uncooperative bilateralism does lead to free
trade but she also acknowledges the costs associated with this route in a setting with more than
one product.
13This discussion summarises part of Findlay (2002). Another issue in the development of a
series of FTAs is the design of rules of origin which are required for speciﬁc products or
services to which the terms of the agreement apply (because each member manages their trade
relations with non-members independently, imports would ﬂow into the group through the
lowest tariﬀ member without this rule). Krueger (1995) explains how the rules of origin can be
manipulated.
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in his analysis of incentives for membership of preferential arrangements.
14
The spoke countries may or may not have arrangements with each other.
15
Hub countries beneﬁt in a number of ways (Wonnacott 1996). Foreign
investors prefer to locate there to get access not only to hubmarkets, b ut
to those of the spoke countries. Also, a ﬁrm based in the hub is more
likely to be able to obtain inputs at low or zero tariﬀs than ﬁrms based in
one of the spokes because it can source from the hub and any one of the
spokes.
16
Some developing economies in East Asia are concerned that, especially
after access to the WTO, China is now even more competitive as a
destination for foreign direct investment. One solution proposed is to
negotiate an FTA with China. But attempts by other developing economies
in East Asia to establish FTAs with China may lead to China becoming the
hubin a series of such agreements, leaving the developing countries at b est no
better oﬀ in terms of competition for foreign direct investment. However, a
constraint on this process is the unwillingness of other countries in the region
to see China emerge as a hubin this manner.
2.5 Supply networks
Supply networks for manufactured products are complex and unstable.
Japan was once a major buyer of Australian raw wool, but now imports little
raw wool from Australia. Instead, Japan imports textile and clothing
products from other countries where Australian wool is processed. The
various stages of processing might take in a number of diﬀerent locations. At
various stages, a product might even move back and forth between the same
locations, neither of which is Japan. Will a bilateral FTA between Australia
and Japan facilitate access to the Japanese market for Australian wool? The
14Some modelling work has been completed on this scenario and the results of this work are
summarised by Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) who note that in consideration of the
expansion of NAFTA ‘the USA and Mexico each prefers to be the sole hub, adding ‘‘spokes’’
through bilateral agreements with new countries, but without full expansion of the agreement.
It is the worst outcome for either the USA or Mexico to be just a spoke while the other
country is the hub– they gain more from expansion of the memb ership (although, particularly
for the USA, the numbers are small).’
15International air transport provides a simple one-sector illustration of this process by
showing how the hub-and-spoke approach pursued by the USA puts spoke countries at a
disadvantage. See Findlay (1997).
16Wonnacott (1996) explains how the result might be an ineﬃcient pattern of investment
that remains even if the hub-and-spoke system evolves into an FTA to which all the spokes
belong.
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to tariﬀs on imports from third countries and not those which a bilateral
agreement might cover.
The Australian wool industry will beneﬁt from having the value adding
processes located in the most eﬃcient locations. Those locations shift as
comparative advantage alters alongside economic growth. The possibilities
change as technology changes and creates new break points in the value
adding chain. The trade policy environment that supports this process is one
which is not discriminatory and which lets newcomer suppliers take over
market share from established producers as competitiveness shifts.
17 The
same sort of process occurs in other manufacturing activities, for example,
electronics and automobiles.
18 It also occurs in services – banks for example
who set up in foreign services markets might want to locate their back-oﬃce
functions in a third country. An airline might have one call centre for its
whole network. The world of commerce does not work in the way that the
FTA architecture presupposes.
2.6 Partial reform and foreign direct investment
The impact of FTAs on the domestic political economy of trade policy
reform has been stressed in the present paper. Foreign direct investment
introduces some new actors into that arena. Foreign ﬁrms (as well as
domestic ﬁrms) make investment decisions on the expectation that commit-
ments to free trade areas will be completed and become important actors in
the decision-making process about further changes in policy. In addition, in
some cases the foreign investors capture rents available from their privileged
position. This is possible in manufacturing, but is also a special problem in
the service sector. For example, negotiation of an FTA gives a foreign
investor ﬁrst mover advantages into a protected (and most likely imperfectly
competitive) market in the services sector. Their arrival adds to the level of
competition in the market place, which is a beneﬁt often claimed for an FTA;
but it also transfers rents oﬀshore and the national economic welfare is
reduced. Partial reform actually leads to an outcome in which the initiator is
worse oﬀ.
17Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) stress the contribution of two-way trade to trade cre-
ation as a result of the introduction of a preferential agreement. They refer to ﬁne degrees
of specialisation that emerge in production processes for manufactured products. This
phenomenon is certainly apparent, but does not occur simply between pairs of countries.
18The extent of value added may also be relatively small, and so small that a ﬁrm does not
qualify for the conditions of the rule of origin to give it preferential access to another mem-
ber’s market. These rules may refer to 40 per cent or 50 per cent value added as a condition.
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It is not clear that the creation of a series of FTAs will lead to free trade. Such
agreements may be diﬃcult to aggregate because their architecture may be
diﬀerent and because of resistance from groups whose interests shifted at the
time of their creation.
Why has this route become so popular? It is not only Australia which is
active in this area but also others who traditionally have not pursued this
strategy, such as Japan and Korea. Economies who have formerly placed a
greater weight on the beneﬁts among their members, the core group (e.g.
those in ASEAN), are now also seeking agreements with other economies not
previously regarded as part of the core group.
Reasons for this interest often remarked upon include the failures to make
progress in the multilateral process, especially after the Seattle WTO
Ministerial meeting. There may be other more fundamental reasons. One is
the emergence of a new set of protectionist forces for the following reasons.
Preferential access to imperfectly competitive markets is attractive because of
the rents to which the entrant has access. Exchanges of access to each other’s
markets for the same product will lead to gains for the businesses involved in
terms of market access and proﬁts. This form of rent seeking could be an
important driver of this policy strategy. This eﬀect is likely to be relatively
important in the now more open markets for services, or at least markets
where the potential for trade via establishment of other modes of supply of
services is now recognised but where impediments remain (e.g. in telecom-
munications). Private interests are dominant in this explanation of the
popularity of preferentialism.
Public interest, or the perception of it, might also be driving policy. It
might appear to be a rational response for a small country to initiate a series
of preferential trade agreements when ‘everyone else’ is either doing so or
expected to do so. As Trade Minister Vaile said in the same speech quoted
earlier ‘the message is that we can go backwards by standing still – if others
are negotiating FTAs and we simply watch’. For some larger countries, the
motivation may also be to become the hub in a network of such
agreements.
19
The beneﬁts of a closer relationship in all its dimensions with the other
party are also ascribed to an FTA. A more intense trading relationship,
higher levels of interaction, more information ﬂows, and deeper institutional
19Another concern is that FTAs will divert resources from other activities, including the
multilateral process. The Minister points out that extra oﬃcers have been appointed to the
area in his department that manages these negotiations. However, those resources still incur
opportunity costs. Garnaut (2001) also stresses the opportunity cost of time in discussion with
counterparts in other governments.
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other issues. Perhaps there is also a hope for preferential treatment in some
circumstances, for example, in the application of contingent protection, a
connection that has been made in the discussion of the eﬀects of an FTA
between Australia and the USA. But what is the impact of the agreement
with one party on other economies? If the argument is presented in the
manner that preference leads to security, then an agreement implies a choice
has been made. It will be interpreted as such by other economies and their
interpretation increases risks in relationships with those economies. There is
no free lunch.
4. The ways out
The options for resolving the FTA dilemma are, broadly, to agree to
cooperate to constrain their use and to ﬁnd eﬃcient alternatives for delivering
the contributions to liberalisation which small group cooperation oﬀers.
20
One solution is to reinstate the primacy of the role of the multilateral
process, most importantly because of the manner in which it produces
reductions in protection. A second reason is its capacity to constrain the FTA
process. The multilateral process has rules which could do so although those
rules need more work, not only for goods but even more importantly for
services.
21
Another solution is to look at other options which are more eﬃcient for
dealing with new issues in which the multilateral process might have no
current coverage, or in which its progress might be slower and which attract
attention in FTA negotiations. Drysdale et al. (1998) make the case for new
types of agreements where explicit cooperation between two or more
economies is required to remove impediments to trade and investment. For
example, those associated with people movement, product standards,
competition policy and consumer protection. These agreements could also
20See Garnaut (2001) for a discussion of options of these types in the context of a nego-
tiation with the USA.
21Crawford and Laird (2001) review the WTO rules on regional arrangements and the
diﬃculty in their application. Snape (1996b) suggests ways in which they might be tightened
including the full liberalisation of trade, at least in all products if not also in all productive
factors; no raising of external barriers to trade and investment on or after formation, a
willingness and capacity to negotiate the reduction of barriers; openness to new members on
conditions similar to those faced by existing members; and homogeneous rules of origin and
dispute settlement procedures. Results of Andriamananjara (2002) also point to the value of a
commitment to lower m.f.n. tariﬀ rates alongside the establishment of a preferential agreement
and this too has been suggested as a rule to be added to the list. On issues in the application of
the WTO rules on regional arrangements to services, see Stephenson (2000).
C. Findlay 614
  Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002include a commitment to liberalise certain sectors of mutual interest, but to
do so on a most favoured nation (m.f.n.) basis.
The risk lies in the formation of new blocs on the basis of these genuinely
new-age agreements.
22 It is important to establish a constitutional rule on the
terms of access for new members at the foundation stage of these
arrangements. Also, prospective but not foundation members should be
consulted on the constitution of the club, which should be directed at moving
to existing international benchmarks on these issues, not to a new set of
benchmarks. These issues are also at the heart of the APEC work program,
which provides a forum for the design and execution of the so-called open
clubapproach. Furthermore, APEC provides a forum in which coalitions can
be built to work on WTO rules with respect with FTAs.
5. Conclusion
Can we ‘walk and chew gum’ (pursue the Doha Development Agenda and
also write FTAs) at the same time? The options are not independent as there
are important interactions between them. The framework used in the present
paper for the discussion of this question was the value of international
commitments as a way of mobilising support for domestic reform. The use of
the preferential arrangements is a weak form of international commitment.
Their use produces a series of agreements, perhaps in a huband spoke
formation, which are diﬃcult to add together to make real free trade but
which add to the costs of doing business. Furthermore, it can undermine
higher level cooperation in the multilateral process.
Australia, however, is now faced with an FTA game in progress. It might
appear to be rational for a country which is small in terms of world trade to
join the game. The dilemma is that the FTA process can lead to the outcomes
just described.
Options for breaking out of the dilemma in which we and our trading
partners now ﬁnd ourselves require new forms of cooperation. The options
include looking for more sophisticated forms of agreement for dealing with
impediments to trade and investment where explicit cooperation within a
group is required, and reinstating the primacy of the multilateral system,
including working on its rules on regional agreements. Australia may be a
small country in terms of global trading, but it has an interest in the
establishing the rules of the system, and it has the track record to make an
eﬀective contribution (e.g. demonstrated through its experience in the Cairns
group, and through the leadership it has shown in APEC).
22These agreements have been called Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreements
(TIFAs). For an example of an argument for a TIFA, see de Brouwer and Warren (2001).
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talk to anyone who wants to speak with us about an FTA and that we have
no preferences on the sequence of arrangements. But prospective partners
should be aware that by 2010 we are committed to removing whatever trade
and investment impediments remain and doing so on an m.f.n. basis. If we
are not prepared to do make that statement, then we should return our focus
to the multilateral system.
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